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You've Come a Long Way, Felon: Helling v. McKinney
Extends the Eighth Amendment to Grant Prisoners the
Exclusive Constitutional Right to a Smoke-Free
Environment
Americans have grown increasingly intolerant of secondary' tobacco
smoke.2 The 1986 Surgeon General's Report outlining the potential health
risks associated with secondary smoke3 caused an explosion in legislation
protecting nonsmokers' rights.4
This Note explores the extension of similar protection to individuals
incarcerated in our nation's prisons. Specifically, it addresses the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Helling v. McKinney' and its expansion of Eighth
Amendment6 protection to include exposure to secondhand smoke and
other risks of future harm.' The Note traces the Supreme Court's evolving
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment: once used solely to prevent bar-
baric treatment of our nation's prisoners, the Eighth Amendment is now
used by the Court to scrutinize the conditions in which prisoners are con-
fined.' The expanded scope of permissible claims under the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment Clause culminated in Helling, in which the Supreme
Court held that allegations of future health risks comprise a valid Eighth
1. Tobacco smoke is characterized as sidestream smoke-smoke released between puffs-
or mainstream smoke-smoke inhaled by the smoker. Secondary smoke, also called Environ-
mental Tobacco Smoke (ETS), is a "combination of sidestream smoke and the fraction of exhaled
mainstream smoke not retained by the smoker." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 7
(1986) [hereinafter INVOLUNTARY SMOKING].
2. In 1964, 46% of adults thought proximity to a smoker was an annoyance; by 1986, the
figure had risen to 69%. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs., REDUCING THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 23
(1989). Additionally, "[i]n a 1985 Gallup poll, 75 percent of the respondents (including 62 per-
cent of the smokers) felt that smokers should refrain from smoking in the presence of non-
smokers." INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 1, at 320.
3. The report found that involuntary smoke may cause lung cancer and possibly other dis-
eases. INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 1, at 13-14.
4. A majority of states have passed some sort of antismoking legislation. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 144.411-.417 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting smoking in public places
and at public meeting places except in specified areas); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-95-20 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1993) (making it illegal to smoke or carry lighted smoking material in places such as public
schools, health-care facilities, and public theaters, except in designated smoking sections); VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.1-291.1 to 15.1-291.11 (Michie Supp. 1993) (prohibiting smoking in specified
places such as elevators, public school buses, and hospital emergency rooms, while requiring
nonsmoking areas in others, such as restaurants, educational buildings, and health-care facilities).
5. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
6. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
7. See infra notes 13-35 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 36-70 and accompanying text.
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Amendment claim.9 Finally, this Note suggests other possible ways to pro-
tect inmates from secondary smoke and similar future risks-options
outside of the Eighth Amendment. 10 The Note concludes that limiting
Eighth Amendment protection and utilizing such alternate forms of relief
would prevent the "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition from becom-
ing a catch-all provision for discontented inmates11 and providing prisoners
more constitutional protection than other citizens.12
In 1986, William McKinney, a prisoner in the Nevada State Prison in
Carson City,' 3 shared a cell with an inmate who smoked five packs of ciga-
rettes a day.14 In January 1987, McKinney filed a pro se complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Nevada, alleging that he suf-
fered from nose bleeds, headaches, chest pains, and lack of energy due to
his involuntary exposure to secondhand smoke. 5 He sought injunctive re-
lief and damages from the director of the prison, the warden, and others for
this alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment right to freedom from cruel
and unusual punishment.16 The trial court granted a directed verdict for the
defendants because the plaintiff could show no causal connection between
his medical problems and his cellmate's smoking.17
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit' 8 found that McKinney
stated a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment when he alleged that
his involuntary exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) 19 posed
9. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2481; see also infra text accompanying note 23.
10. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
13. McKinney v. Anderson, No. CV-N-87-36-ECR, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18594, at *2 (D.
Nev. Apr. 8, 1988) (magistrate's report and recommendation).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at *3.
17. McKinney v. Anderson, No. CV-N-87-36-PHA, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18338, at *2 (D.
Nev. Dec. 26, 1989) (order denying the plaintiffs motion for production of trial transcripts and
payment of court reporters at the government's expense).
18. McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1512 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Helling v. McKinney, 112 S. Ct. 291 (1991), reinstated and remanded, McKinney v. Anderson,
959 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'd and remanded sub nom. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475
(1993). The magistrate concluded that freedom from cigarette smoke was not a right guaranteed
by the Constitution. Id. at 1503. Additionally, the magistrate found no Eighth Amendment viola-
tion because McKinney had failed to present evidence of medical problems resulting from expo-
sure to the smoke or deliberate indifference to his present medical needs on the part of prison
officials. Id. The court of appeals affirmed these findings but nevertheless found an Eighth
Amendment violation. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1509.
19. See supra note 1.
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an unreasonable health risk.2" The court held that McKinney should have
been permitted to prove his case.21
The United States Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the court of ap-
peals,22 holding that McKinney stated "a cause of action under the Eighth
Amendment by alleging that petitioners have, with deliberate indifference,
exposed him to levels of ETS that pose an unreasonable risk of serious
damage to his future health."23 In reaching this conclusion, Justice White,
writing for himself and six other justices, rejected the defendants' argument
that, based on precedent, McKinney was entitled to Eighth Amendment
protection only if the prison conditions caused him to suffer a serious, cur-
rent medical problem.24 The Court held that the Eighth Amendment applies
to serious risks of harm as well.' To support its decision, the majority
pointed to precedent holding that the Constitution mandates safe prison
conditions.26 Because McKinney's exposure to ETS could be an unsafe
condition, the Court remanded the case in order for McKinney to have the
chance to prove his allegations.27 Consistent with its decision in Wilson v.
Seiter,28 the Court required McKinney to satisfy both the subjective and
objective components of an.Eighth Amendment claim.29
20. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1509. To bolster its decision, the court pointed to scientific opin-
ion regarding the dangers of ETS and the fact that "it indeed violates society's standards of de-
cency to expose an unwilling inmate to levels of ETS that pose an unreasonable risk of harm to
human health." Id. at 1505.
21. Id. at 1509.
22. After its first review of the case, the Supreme Court remanded for further consideration
in light of a recent opinion. Helling v. McKinney, 112 S. Ct. 291 (1991). That case held that
prisoners who allege unconstitutional conditions of confinement must prove a subjective compo-
nent of deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials, in addition to an objective require-
ment of a serious injury. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1991); see also infra notes 58-
64 and accompanying text. On remand the court of appeals reinstated its prior decision, reasoning
that this subjective component merely added to McKinney's burden of proof and had no bearing
on its previous finding that his exposure to ETS satisfied the objective component of his claim.
McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Helling v. McKin-
ney, 112 S. Ct. 3024 (1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
23. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1993).
24. Id. at 2480. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Souter joined Justice White's opinion. Id.
25. Justice White wrote: "It would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly
proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had
happened to them.' Id. at 2481.
26. Id. at 2480-81. The Court cited DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (stating that the Eighth Amendment requires prisoners to be provided
with basic human needs, including "reasonable safety") and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
315-16 (1982) (reiterating that it is "cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in
unsafe conditions").
27. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2481.
28. 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991); see also supra note 22.
29. The Court found that the objective component required proof of exposure to unreasona-
bly high levels of ETS that could lead to potential harm and proof that such exposure to second-
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In his dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, expressed con-
cern about the impact the Court's holding would have on Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Justice Thomas argued that the majority in Helling,
and every other court that had found conditions of confinement to violate
the Eighth Amendment, overlooked a fundamental requirement-that the
act in question be "punishment.""0 Justice Thomas believed that, by up-
holding this claim under the Eighth Amendment, the Court stretched the
definition of punishment beyond anything within the reasonable contempla-
tion of the framers of the Bill of Rights.3" Because Justice Thomas refused
to presume that injuries suffered in prison constituted punishment for
Eighth Amendment purposes,32 and none of McKinney's allegations con-
formed with the historical definition of punishment, 3 he found the Eighth
Amendment inapplicable.34 Furthermore, Justice Thomas proposed that
even if the Court were to expand Eighth Amendment protection to condi-
tions of confinement, there was no reason to apply it to cases such as Mc-
Kinney's in which "there has been no injury at all."35
Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment has evolved gradually over
the years since its ratification in 1791.36 Originally the Court, acting ac-
cording to what it perceived to be the intentions of the Amendment's draft-
ers,37 limited its applicability to the prevention of torturous or barbaric
hand smoke violated contemporary standards of decency. The subjective component required
McKinney to prove that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to these risks. Helling, 113
S. Ct. at 2482.
30. Id. at 2483-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. Justice Thomas defined punishment as a penalty inflicted for the perpetration of a crime.
Id at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He concluded that there was no historical evidence that the
"framers and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment had anything other than this common understand-
ing of 'punishment' in mind." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Thomas rea-
soned that because the Supreme Court had not considered conditions of confinement to be
protected by the Eighth Amendment during the first 185 years following its adoption, such situa-
tions were never intended to be covered by the provision. Id. at 2484 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
33. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 2485 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas questioned the majority's use of precedent,
stating: "None of our prior decisions, including the three that are cited by the Court today .. [,]
held that the mere threat of injury can violate the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 2485 n.3 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
36. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (stating that "the Amendment has been
interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 329 (1971)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (finding that Eighth Amendment interpretations have varied over time,
evidenced by the fact that "a penalty that was permissible at one time in our Nation's history is not
necessarily permissible today"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (recognizing that
"the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static") (footnote
omitted).
37. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170 (citing Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 842 (1969)).
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punishment." In the twentieth century, however, realizing that "a principle
to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth, 39 the Court began to expand the scope of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Yet, after extending Eighth Amendment protection to disproportion-
ate and excessive punishments4° and to those degrading to "the dignity of
man,' 41 many courts were still unwilling to delve into matters of prison
administration or conditions.4'
In 1976, however, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
applies to deprivations that are not part of a sentence, yet are suffered dur-
ing imprisonment. In Estelle v. Gamble,43 an inmate claimed that the fail-
ure of prison officials to provide him with adequate medical treatment
violated his Eighth Amendment rights.' The Court agreed, holding that
deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs can constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.45 The Estelle Court determined that the
government is responsible for providing medical treatment to prisoners in
38. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 264-65 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that early Eighth
Amendment cases limited protection to torture or similarly outrageous actions); In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (declaring that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death"), overruled by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130, 135 (1879) (finding Eighth Amendment violated by atrocities such as disembowelling,
beheading, and quartering), overruled by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
39. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
40. In Weems, the Court found that 12 years imprisonment for falsifying public records was
cruel and unusual. Id. at 381.
41. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). Finding that denationalization for wartime
desertion violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court reasoned:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards .... The Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.
Id. at 100-01. Thereafter, the Court applied this holding to the death penalty, finding that in some
cases its imposition violated the Eight Amendment. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239. But cf Gregg, 428
U.S. at 169 (holding that the death penalty does not violate the Constitution).
42. See, e.g., Kirby v. Thomas, 336 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1964) ("[F]ederal courts do not
have the power to regulate ordinary internal management and discipline of prisons."); Stroud v.
Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir.) (declaring the traditional belief that courts should not
supervise treatment of prisoners), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951); see also Russell W. Gray,
Note, Wilson v. Seiter Defining the Components of and Proposing a Direction for Eighth Amend-
ment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1339, 1344 (1992) (discussing the Supreme
Court's "hands off' treatment of prison condition cases until the 1960s).
43. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
44. Id. at 97.
45. Id. at 104. In this case, the Court failed to find sufficient proof of deliberate indifference
because medical personnel had seen the prisoner 17 times in a three-month period, and their only
failure had been neglecting to order an X-ray that would have been beneficial to the prisoner's
treatment. Id. at 107.
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its custody, because those inmates are unable to provide for their own
needs.46
The Supreme Court further extended the boundaries of the Eighth
Amendment in Rhodes v. Chapman,47 the first case in which the Court ex-
amined general prison conditions under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.48 Before Rhodes, the Supreme Court had deferred to state legisla-
tures and prison officials on conditions of confinement.49 Once it entered
this arena, the Court had to set new standards for relief since prison condi-
tions cases involved different considerations than those alleging torturous
and barbaric actions. Rhodes and the cases that followed attempted to de-
fine the necessary components of this "new" Eighth Amendment claim.
In determining whether housing two inmates in a cell designed for one
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, the Rhodes Court focused on
what may be described as the objective component of the Eighth Amend-
ment: It attempted to determine whether the deprivation suffered was seri-
ous enough to state a claim.5" While the Court acknowledged that double
celling may cause pain, it is not the "unnecessary or wanton" infliction of
pain that would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.5' The Eighth
Amendment was inapplicable because the inmates suffered no deprivation
of "essential food, medical care, or sanitation." 2
In the next case addressing the rights of prisoners under the Eighth
Amendment, the Court further defined the standard of relief by requiring
the fulfillment of a subjective component. In Whitley v. Albers, 3 the Court
held that prison officials must possess a culpable state of mind. 4 In
Whitley, an inmate shot by a prison official during a riot alleged a violation
of his Eighth Amendment rights. 5 The Court concluded:
46. Id. at 103.
47. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
48. Id. at 347.
49. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (stating that solving prison
difficulties "require[s] expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all
of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment" and that "courts are ill-equipped to deal with the ... problems of prison administration and
reform"), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
50. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346-47.
51. Id. at 348-49 (applying the standard set forth in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976)). The Court also declared that "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,
and prisons of [this] type, which house persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of
discomfort." Id. at 349.
52. Id. at 348.
53. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
54. Id. at 319.
55. Id. at 317. Prison officials shot some inmates in an attempt to free another prison official
whom the inmates had taken hostage. Id. at 316.
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To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not pur-
port to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack
of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.... It is obduracy
and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that char-
acterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with
establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs,
or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock 6
Because the prison official in Whitley applied the force in a good faith effort
to restore peace, the Court refused to find a violation of the inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights.5 7
In 1991, in Wilson v. Seiter,58 the Court qualified the subjective prong
of Eighth Amendment condition claims. In Wilson, a prisoner alleged that
various prison conditions, when considered as a whole, amounted to cruel
and unusual punishment.59 The Court concluded that for conduct not for-
mally imposed as punishment to be cruel and unusual, the prisoner's allega-
tions must satisfy both the objective and subjective components of the
Eighth Amendment.6" However, the Court rejected the argument that the
Whitley6 standard of obduracy and wantonness applied in prison condition
cases.62 Instead, it found that the lower threshold of deliberate indifference
required in Estelle v. Gamble63 was the proper standard for questions of
inadequate conditions.'r
A year later in Hudson v. McMillian,6' the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Whitley, which had held that excessive force cases merely require satisfac-
56. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 326.
58. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
59. Id. at 2323. Wilson alleged "overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage
space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms,
unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally and physically ill
inmates." Id.
60. Id. at 2325, 2327. The Court reasoned that since the word "punishment" implied an
intentional act, if the act in question was not part of the punishment meted out, the Eighth Amend-
ment requires a culpable state of mind. Id. at 2326.
61. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); see also supra text accompanying note 56.
62. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
63. 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see also supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
64. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327. The Court found that the deprivations Wilson suffered were
not sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component and amount to an Eighth Amendment
violation. The Court stated, "Nothing so amorphous as 'overall conditions' can rise to the level
of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists." Id.
However, the Court did recognize that "[s] ome conditions of confinement may establish an
Eighth Amendment violation 'in combination' when each would not do so alone, but only when
they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human
need such as food, warmth, or exercise." Id. at 2327.
65. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
19941 1405
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion of the subjective component,66 and extended the holding to cases in
which force is used absent a prison disruption.67 In Hudson, the Court held
that the use of excessive force against a prisoner may amount to cruel and
unusual punishment even if the prisoner suffers only minor injuries. 68 The
Court found the objective component to be "responsive to 'contemporary
standards of decency.' ,,69 Therefore, it briefly addressed, but ultimately
dismissed, the requirement of a serious injury as unimportant in excessive
force cases. "When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to
cause harm, contemporary standards of decency are always violated. 7°
Coming so soon after Hudson, the refusal of the Helling Court to re-
quire a significant present injury in order to state an Eighth Amendment
claim may not seem surprising. However, Hudson is distinguishable be-
cause it involved the use of force. In the past, the Court afforded allega-
tions of excessive force special treatment and distinguished cases, such as
Helling, in which the inmate alleged unconstitutional conditions of confine-
ment.71 Whereas conditions cases retained the Estelle standard of deliber-
ate indifference, 72 force cases required a heightened standard of
maliciousness. 73 The Court in Hudson did away with the objective require-
ment of a serious deprivation or injury for cases claiming undue force pre-
cisely because of this intensified subjective standard. Since McKinney
alleged unconstitutional conditions and not excessive force, the Helling
Court was not justified in eroding the previously stringent requirement of an
injury74 without requiring the heightened culpability that an allegation of
force mandates.
The key to evaluating the Helling Court's decision is defining what
constitutes an "injury": a present injury or a significant risk of future in-
66. Whifley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); see also supra notes 53-57 and accompany-
ing text.
67. Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 999.
68. Id. at 997. After an argument, Officer McMillian punched the prisoner, Hudson, several
times while another officer held Hudson down. Id.
69. Id. at 1000 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
70. Id.
71. Compare Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (holding that when excessive
force is alleged, the Eighth Amendment is violated even absent significant injury if force is ap-
plied in an unnecessary and wanton manner) with Wilson v. Seiter, III S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991)
(requiring both present injury and deliberate indifference); see also supra notes 53-64 and accom-
panying text.
72. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327 (holding that prisoners who claim that conditions violate the
Eighth Amendment must show deliberate indifference on part of prison officials); see also supra
notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319; see also supra text accompanying note 56.
74. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (holding that although double
celling probably caused the inmates pain, it did not constitute the unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain that the Eighth Amendment prohibits); see also supra notes 50-52 and accompanying
text.
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jury. Technically, the Helling Court did require proof of an objective as
well as a subjective component.75 The Court simply was willing to accept
proof of an unreasonable risk of injury to satisfy the objective compo-
nent 7 6 -an unprecedented ruling in the Eighth Amendment context. The
majority reasoned that the Eighth Amendment should not allow prison offi-
cials to ignore potentially harmful conditions merely because prisoners have
not yet suffered symptoms. 77 According to the Court, the Eighth Amend-
ment should protect not only those who suffer a present injury, but also
should extend to individuals whose conditions of confinement create a risk
of future harm.78 To support this conclusion, the Court relied on prior deci-
sions holding that unsafe conditions are cruel and unusual punishment.79
The Court concluded that exposure to ETS could constitute such an unsafe
condition.8 0 Thus, the Court used the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause as a form of "preventative medicine," whereas critics such as Justice
Thomas" would prefer a mentality more akin to the old notion about not
fixing things that are not broken.
The Court's decision to extend Eighth Amendment protection in this
case may reflect current sentiment deploring secondhand smoke. 2 Trop v.
Dulles8 3 held that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety." 4 The Court in Helling consequently held that, on remand, McKinney
would have to prove that his involuntary exposure to ETS violates present
standards of decency."5 The Court obviously thought that establishing this
fact was indeed possible and provided McKinney with the opportunity to
make his case.8 6 In a country where people often enjoy statutory protection
75. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
77. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2481; see also supra note 25.
78. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2481.
79. Id. at 2480-81; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
80. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2481. The Court, however, failed to consider whether exposure to
ETS constituted a definite health risk and was therefore unsafe. Medical research has yet to
determine this question. See infra note 106.
81. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
83. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
84. Id. at 101.
85. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2481.
86. Application of the "standards of decency" test, however, presumes that conditions of
confinement constitute punishment in the first place. At the time Helling reached the Supreme
Court, the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to cases alleging improper conditions was well
established. Id. at 2480; see also supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. However, the basis
for such an "undisputed" proposition still warrants questioning. As Justice Thomas argued in his
dissent in Helling, the Court has never analyzed the text and history of the Eighth Amendment in
deciding whether prison conditions constitute punishment, but instead has simply stated it to be
true. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2484-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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from involuntary exposure to secondhand smoke in the private workplace,8 7
in elevators,88 and on domestic airline flights,8 9 the Court may have been
correct.90
On the other hand, some evidence shows that the risk of which McKin-
ney complained is not grave enough to constitute a violation of common
standards of decency. After the parties filed their briefs in this case, the
Bush Administration and thirty-four states requested that the Court rule
against McKinney. 91 The Administration claimed there was "no basis for
ruling that exposure to secondhand smoke could even theoretically violate
the Eighth Amendment," because smoking is "'widespread in society'"
and" 'a habit that is deeply rooted in our history and experience.' "92 Ad-
ditionally, several lower federal courts have refused prisoners' ETS claims,
finding that exposure to ETS did not violate public standards of decency.93
The Court's decision in Helling may also reflect the recent willingness
of some courts to recognize claims of significant future risks as remedia-
ble.94 Such claims, much like McKinney's, "involve allegations of harm
from a disease not yet contracted and not certain to occur."9" Courts grant-
ing relief for this allegation often do so in one of two ways. First, they may
allow recovery for future damages to be added to a "present injury" claim.96
However, in the absence of an obvious, present physical injury, certain ju-
risdictions have been lenient in interpreting what constitutes a "present"
87. See, e.g., CoNN. Gm. STAT. ANN. § 31-40q (West Supp. 1993) (mandating that employ-
ers establish at least one smoke-free workplace for employees); see also V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23,
§ 892 (1993) (requiring that preferences of nonsmokers prevail over those of smokers in offices).
88. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202.2491-1(a) (Michie Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-95-20(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
89. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(1)(A) (1988).
90. Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Avery v. Powell, 695 F. Supp.
632, 640 (D.N.H. 1988).
91. Linda Greenhouse, Court Offers Inmates a Way to Escape Prison Smokers, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 19, 1993, at A8.
92. Id. (quoting the Bush Administration brief).
93. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Quinlan, 729 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1990) ("[C]ontemporary soci-
ety has yet to view exposure to second-hand smoke as transgressing its 'broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency.' "(citation omitted)), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 295 (1991); Gorman v. Moody, 710 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (finding the
Eighth Amendment inapplicable because "society cannot yet completely agree on the propriety of
nonsmoking areas and a smoke-free environment").
94. See Melissa Moore Thompson, Comment, Enhanced Risk of Disease Claims: Limiting
Recovery to Compensation for Loss, Not Chance, 72 N.C. L. REv. 453, 454 (1993). Other courts
refuse to grant relief for mere exposure to dangerous material that poses an increased risk of future
harm. See, e.g., Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir.) (requiring
"manifest injury" for tort claim because recovery based on mere exposure would compensate
those who never become injured), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
95. Thompson, supra note 94, at 453.
96. Id. at 461-65.
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injury. 7 Some courts have held that mere exposure to a threatening sub-
stance alone is sufficient•98 Other jurisdictions view the increased risk of
disease as a present injury.99 One court held that "[d]izziness, leg cramps
and a persistent stinging sensation in feet and fingers"-symptoms similar
to those alleged by McKinney' 0°-constituted a present injury.1 1 Second,
some courts recognize an enhanced risk cause of action.'02 These courts
allow plaintiffs a cause of action for either "(1) a present injury with future
consequences, or (2) an invasion of a legally protected interest actionable
absent any other manifestation."1 3
Regardless of the method of relief, many courts only allow recovery
for future damages if they are "more likely than not" or " 'reasonably cer-
tain' "to happen."w Although the Helling Court similarly recognized a fu-
ture risk as remediable, it went beyond these holdings. It allowed relief
under the Eighth Amendment even when there is uncertainty about whether
any harm will occur." 5
While extending Eighth Amendment protection to risks of future harm,
the Helling Court offered little guidance for determining what risks are suf-
ficient. This lack of direction leaves the lower courts to struggle with the
problem of determining when a condition poses "an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to ... future health."'1 6 Because the Supreme Court was
willing to entertain claims involving ETS exposure even though research
has not determined the extent of this risk,0 7 prisoners may swamp the
courts with cases claiming insignificant risks. The decision in Helling
could open the floodgates for Eighth Amendment claims just as the decision
97. Id. at 462-63.
98. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.) ("injury
... is the inhalation of asbestos fibers"), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
99. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 322 (W.D. Tenn. 1986),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
100. See supra text accompanying note 15.
101. Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Servs., 788 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1986).
102. Thompson, supra note 94, at 465; see, e.g., Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 208
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1992).
103. Thompson, supra note 94, at 465-66.
104. Id. at 462, 464 (citations omitted).
105. See, e.g., ENvmomENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE 369-70 (Donald J. Ecobichon & Joseph M.
Wu eds., 1990) (summarizing conference reports suggesting that ETS exposure does not cause any
increased risk of cardiovascular disease or cancer).
106. Id.
107. See generally id. at 375 (concluding that research has failed to establish ETS as a health
hazard); INvoLuNTARY SMOKING, supra note 1, at 13-14 (finding that secondary smoke is a cause
of disease but calling for more conclusive research to determine the magnitude of risk).
Additionally, these studies question whether the Court was justified in upholding McKin-
ney's claim on the basis that unsafe conditions comprise an Eighth Amendment violation. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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to expand the doctrine beyond torturous and barbaric actions did a few de-
cades ago.108
Helling may also have an impact on nonsmokers' rights in general. In
Helling, the Supreme Court stopped just short of holding that McKinney
had a constitutional right to a smoke-free environment. However, by per-
mitting McKinney to bring his case under the Eighth Amendment, the
Court allowed him more protection than courts have permitted unincarcer-
ated nonsmoking citizens under the same Constitution. 10 9
Many nonsmokers have attempted to assert a constitutional right to a
smoke-free environment, arguing that involuntary exposure to ETS "de-
prives them of life, liberty, and property without due process, invades their
right to privacy, [and] chills First Amendment speech rights." 0 Although
some courts have recognized a common-law claim for a smoke-free work-
place, 1 ' courts have generally refused to hear nonsmokers' claims under
the Constitution.I" Instead, courts have found legislatures to be the proper
forum for such relief.13 One court warned: "For the Constitution to be
read to protect nonsmokers from inhaling tobacco smoke would be to
broaden the rights of the Constitution to limits heretofore unheard of, and to
engage in that type of adjustment of individual liberties better left to the
people acting through legislative processes.""'
In short, prisoners are the only nonsmokers who have succeeded in
claiming that exposure to ETS violates their constitutional rights. Although
108. Cf Robert G. Doumar, Prisoners' Civil Rights Suits: A Pompous Delusion, 11 GEo.
MASON U. L. Rv. 1, 6 (1988) (stating that prisoners filed 218 cases in 1966 alleging constitu-
tional violations; by 1982, the number had risen to over 16,000).
109. See infra note 112 and accompanying text. The Helling Court allowed this expansion of
the Eighth Amendment despite an instruction set forth in Rhodes to "proceed cautiously" in
Eighth Amendment decisions because " '[revisions] cannot be reversed short of a constitutional
amendment.'" Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 176 (1976)).
110. Elizabeth B. Thompson, Note, The Constitutionality of an Off-Duty Smoking Ban for
Public Employees: Should the State Butt Out?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 491, 504 (1990).
111. See, e.g., Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (finding
failure to eliminate exposure to secondhand smoke to be breach of duty "to provide a reasonably
safe workplace"); Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 368 A.2d 408, 415-16 (N.J. 1976) (holding
that common-law duty to provide safe workplace required New Jersey Bell to provide a smoke-
free workplace for its employees).
112. See, e.g., Federal Employees for NonSmokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181,
185 (D.D.C. 1978) (stating that there is no First or Fifth Amendment constitutional protection for
nonsmokers against exposure to smoke), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979); Gasper v. Louisiana
Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. La. 1976) (holding that there was no
deprivation of any constitutional right under the First, Fifth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments in
allowing smoking in a public facility).
113. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 722; see also Federal Employees, 446 F. Supp. at 185 (stating
that "such matters are better left to the legislative or administrative process").
114. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 722.
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common sense and fairness may dictate otherwise, the Supreme Court is
giving people incarcerated for crimes against society more constitutional
rights than law-abiding citizens. Arguably, prisoners should receive their
relief from secondhand smoke in the same manner as the rest of the popula-
tion-statutorily." 5 Some may attempt to justify decisions like Helling on
the ground that prisoners are forced to remain in the presence of second-
hand smoke while the rest of the population is free to leave; yet this ration-
ale is not always a sound justification for preferential treatment of
prisoners. Other members of the population can be similarly "trapped" in a
hospital room with a smoker or in a job in which they are exposed to
smoke, for example, and receive no aid from the Constitution." 6 The fact
that the government incarcerates some individuals due to their unlawful be-
havior may entitle them to provision of their basic needs." 7 Nevertheless,
it should not entitle them to greater constitutional protection from second-
hand smoke than others involuntarily exposed to it every day.
The Helling Court's desire to protect McKinney and other prisoners
from prospective dangers is both understandable and reasonable based on
precedent applying the Eighth Amendment's protections to prison condi-
tions." 8 Exposure to ETS may be "cruel and unusual" because it may vio-
late current standards of decency. Yet when one examines the implications
of the Court's holding the dangers of the decision become clear.
Now that the Court has expanded the Eighth Amendment to encom-
pass future harm, the Eighth Amendment provides prisoners with an enor-
mous amount of protection under the Constitution-arguably, even more
protection than the rest of the population. Although a constitutional provi-
sion may have to mature with society, extending it too far beyond the origi-
nal expectations of the drafters is dangerous. To protect Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence from unlimited expansion," 9 the Supreme Court
should have drawn the line in Helling by requiring a present injury for
Eighth Amendment claims. Without such a restraint, the Amendment may
115. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
116. Surely a person confined to a hospital bed deserves to be free from exposure to ETS, yet
even an ill person would not get this protection if statutes or hospital administrators did not pre-
vent his roommate or health-care providers from lighting up. Similarly, a waitress may be eco-
nomically "trapped" in a job where she must involuntarily breathe ETS and may be unable to get
relief unless the legislatures make restaurants smoke-free. "Imprisonment" means more than be-
ing behind bars.
117. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1989) (explaining that when the State restrains individuals in such a way that they cannot care for
themselves, it has a duty to provide for basic human needs).
118. See supra notes 43-70 and accompanying text.
119. In his dissent in Hudson, Justice Thomas worried that, by allowing recovery absent a
serious injury, the Court was turning the Eighth Amendment into a "National Code of Prison
Regulation." Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1010 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1994] 1411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
eventually be read to provide redress to prisoners complaining of minor
prison discomforts.
Although McKinney's plight evokes sympathy, the Eighth Amend-
ment is not the proper source of relief in this case.120 Legislatures and
prison officials should determine prison smoking policies; courts should re-
serve Eighth Amendment protection for cases involving punishment that
constitutes present injury, or at the very least, for future harm that is more
likely than not to occur. At least one state has already enacted legislation
that bans smoking in prison areas.12 Additionally, the federal prison sys-
tem and many states "have adopted policies that restrict smoking to desig-
nated areas of prisons and prohibit wardens from assigning a nonsmoking
inmate to the same cell as a smoker except when impractical. 1 22 By refus-
ing to involve itself in this aspect of prison regulation, the Court could have
left this problem in the proper hands of the prison system or the legislatures,
two bodies that could have remedied, and in McKinney's case did rem-
edy, 23 the problem of secondhand smoke in prisons. Instead, the Court
chose to address the problem by expanding an already elastic and unpredict-
able constitutional doctrine.
JACQUELINE M. KANE
120. In the alternative, McKinney could possibly have brought a state law claim. See Gray,
supra note 42, at 1342 n.15 (noting the possibility that prisoners complaining of improper prison
conditions may receive relief in state law actions for tort or injunctive relief, among others).
Discussion of these alternative remedies is beyond the scope of this Note.
121. ALASKA STAT. § 18.35.300 (1990).
122. Greenhouse, supra note 91, at 8.
123. After he filed his claim, McKinney was moved to a different facility which had a non-
smoking policy and was assigned a nonsmoking cellmate. Additionally, on January 10, 1992, the
Director of the Nevada State Prisons adopted a formal nonsmoking policy that restricts smoking to
specifically designated areas. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2482.
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